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Bitcoin developers possess a countermeasure for the potential disruption posed by quantum computing. The more formidable challenge lies in the network’s capacity to achieve consensus on a solution promptly. The threat that quantum computing presents to Bitcoin is less of a technical hurdle and more of a political one.
These are the core assertions from a recent commentary by Guillaume Girard, a venture associate at UTXO Management, an investment firm dedicated to Bitcoin and a subsidiary of Nakamoto Inc. In his article, titled “Bitcoin and the Quantum Threat: A Non-Technical Guide,” Girard posits that while a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is not yet a reality and may never attain the capability to compromise Bitcoin’s encryption, the community must act proactively. This urgency stems from the fact that the governance process for any protocol modification proceeds at a pace comparable to that of a legislative body.
Bitcoin’s security framework relies on elliptic curve cryptography, which safeguards the private keys that grant access to wallets. A quantum computer of sufficient power, operating Shor’s algorithm, could potentially deduce a private key from a disclosed public key, facilitating widespread theft. Research published by Google’s Quantum AI team in March suggests that a machine with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits—significantly lower than previous estimates of 10 million—could theoretically break this encryption. Google’s internal objective for post-quantum readiness is set for 2029. Approximately 1.7 million BTC are currently held in legacy Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) addresses, where public keys are permanently visible on the blockchain, rendering them the most susceptible targets.
A quantum solution is available for Bitcoin
Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 360 (BIP-360), introduced by developer Hunter Beast, proposes a novel output type named Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR). This innovation eliminates the exposure of public keys in standard transactions. The proposal has been integrated into Bitcoin’s development repository and is currently undergoing active scrutiny.
A supplementary proposal, BIP-361, co-authored by Jameson Lopp, outlines a three-stage transition strategy to move away from vulnerable signature schemes. However, Phase B of this strategy carries the risk of freezing assets in wallets that do not complete the migration within a five-year timeframe.
An alternative proposal, dubbed Hourglass, would restrict quantum attackers to moving stolen funds in limited increments—potentially one BTC per block. This mechanism would mitigate the economic impact and redirect fee revenue to miners.
The more intricate issue pertains to assets that cannot be migrated: dormant wallets, inactive holders, and an estimated 1.1 million BTC associated with Satoshi Nakamoto. Girard identifies two potential resolutions, each presenting significant drawbacks.
The initial approach involves forfeiting funds in quantum-vulnerable addresses after a designated cutoff—an effective remedy, though critics argue it establishes a problematic precedent for censorship on a protocol designed for neutrality. The second option, Hourglass, acknowledges that theft may occur but imposes constraints on the movement of pilfered assets to lessen market disruption and price volatility.
Neither of these solutions is without flaws, and both necessitate the same element: widespread social consensus among users, miners, developers, and, for the first time, major institutional investors such as BlackRock.
Institutions are already reacting
The discourse has expanded beyond developer email threads. In January 2026, Jefferies eliminated its entire 10% Bitcoin allocation from its model pension portfolio, with global equity strategist Christopher Wood citing quantum risk as a potential long-term hazard to Bitcoin’s cryptographic underpinnings.
Michael Saylor of Strategy announced a Bitcoin Security Program to collaborate with the broader security community on quantum preparedness, framing the challenge as an engineering endeavor rather than an immediate crisis. Citi’s cybersecurity division has assigned a valuation in the trillions of dollars to the quantum threat across the cryptocurrency landscape.
Girard’s assessment remains pragmatic: the ultimate contest is between the development timeline of a CRQC capable of breaching Bitcoin’s defenses and the community’s timeline for implementing a soft fork. Based on current indicators, he believes Bitcoin is on schedule. However, he observes that if sovereign and institutional buyers perceive the developers’ actions as too sluggish, these stakeholders possess both the motivation and the financial leverage to expedite consensus outside of established frameworks.
The predominant buyer of Bitcoin is no longer the retail sector; it is now governments and asset managers who will not tolerate inaction. While most experts still believe a practical attack is several years away, Girard points out that the ambiguity of the situation obscures the timeline, and in this scenario, awaiting absolute certainty constitutes a risk in itself.
Bitcoin Magazine is published by BTC Inc, a subsidiary of Nakamoto Inc. UTXO Management is also a subsidiary of Nakamoto Inc. (NASDAQ: NAKA)
Original article : bitcoinmagazine.com